The physical barriers to communication merely impede the supply of information. In order to increase public knowledge, not only is it necessary to present more information, but it is essential that the mass audience be exposed to and that it absorb the information. And in order to insure such exposure and absorption, the psychological characteristics of human beings must be taken into account. All persons do not offer equal targets for information campaigns. Surveys consistently find that a certain proportion of the population is not familiar with any particular event. Offhand, it might be thought that information concerning that event was not distributed broadly enough to reach them, but that this group would still have an equal chance of exposure to other information. Yet, when the knowledge of this same group is measured with respect to a second event, they tend also to have little information in that area. And similarly, they will have little or no information concerning a third event.
If all persons provided equal targets for exposure, and the sole determinant of public knowledge were the magnitude of the given information, there would be no reason for the same individuals always to show a relative lack of knowledge. Instead, there is something about the uninformed which makes them harder to reach, no matter what the level or nature of the information.
Thus, in May I946, NORC asked a question to determine public knowledge of the report of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine which recommended the admission of IOO,OOO Jewish immigrants to that country. Only 28 per cent of the national sample expressed any awareness of this report. It might be assumed that the remaining 72 per cent were ready and willing to be exposed, but that there had been too little information about the report. Yet Table i shows that this unaware group consistently tended to have less awareness of other information about the international scene which had been much more widely reported.
The size of this generally uninformed group in the population may be indicated by computing an index of general knowledge based on all five information questions in the field of foreign affairs, which were asked on that particular survey. The five subjects covered by these questions were: Table 2 shows how the population divided in its awareness of these five items. As may be seen, roughly one person out of seven reported no awareness of any of the five items, and ap- small, in comparison with the psychological differences to be shown later in Table 4 and elsewhere. The next section discusses the effect of certain psychological factors on level of knowledge. .58. Table 4 shows how the population divides in its interest in these eight issues. all the more significant when it is remembered that the list included such overpowering subjects as the atomic bomb and our relations with Germany and Russia, and that the respondent's own estimate of his degree of interest, doubtless subject to prestige considerations, was accepted without question.
The close relationship between apathy on the one hand, and ignorance of information materials on the other, is shown in Table 5 . It is a likely assump- tion that both the contrasted groups in the table had equal opportunity to learn about the two reports. Yet the information reached approximately half of the interested group, and only about onefifth of the disinterested.5
The relationship between interest and knowledge can be demonstrated in a different way, if we compare the scores of each of our interest groups on our knowledge index. As seen in Table   6 , at each stage of increasing interest, knowledge rises correspondingly. It can be argued, of course, that the exposed people became interested after they had been exposed to the information, and that the disinterested persons are apathetic only because they were not exposed. It is probable that the two factors are interdependent; as people learn more, their interest increases, and as their interest increases, they are impelled to learn more. Nevertheless, from the point of view of initiating a specific campaign at some point in time, it remains true that in the case even of outstanding public issues, large groups in the population admit "little or no interest" in the problem. had not yet made a decision (on their vote) exposed themselves to propaganda which fit their not-yet-conscious political predispositions." Our evidence from polling national samples in other information areas supports the view that people tend to expose themselves to information which is congenial with their prior attitudes, and to avoid exposure to information which is not congenial. Although it was not possible to administer beforeand-after tests of attitudes, the following technique offers indirect evidence to support the argument of selective exposure.
National samples were asked if they had heard or read anything about a given piece of information. The entire sample was then given the gist of the information in one or two sentences.
(In the case of those who had admitted familiarity with the material, the description was prefaced by some such phrase as, "Well, as you remember . . .") Immediately following the description of the information, the entire sample was then asked some relevant attitude question.
We found in every case that the group who reported prior exposure to the information had a different attitudinal reaction from those without prior exposure. One could assume that this difference reflected the influence of the information on those previously exposed, except that, as described above, both graups, before being asked the attitude question, had been supplied with identical descriptions of the information in question.
Thus, in June I946, a national sample of the adult population was asked whether they had heard or read about the Anglo-American Committee report on Palestine [i] . Every respondent was then either told or reminded of the essential provisions of the report, and was asked whether he favored United States assistance in keeping order in Palestine if ioo,ooo additional Jews were admitted to that country [7] . As seen in Table 7 , those with prior knowledge of the report were significantly more favorable toward such assistance.
Similarly, in April I946, a national sample was asked whether they had heard or read about the recent joint statement by England, France, and the United States which denounced the Franco government of Spain [8] . Included in the question was the gist of the statement: "the hope that General Franco's government in Spain would soon be followed by a more democratic one." The entire sample was then asked its attitude toward this country's Spanish policy [9] . Again, those who had prior knowledge of the three-power statement were significantly more hostile in their attitudes toward Franco.
See Table 7 . It is true that those who learned about the report or statement for the first time during the interview were more inclined to offer no opinion when questioned on their attitudes, but the above table excludes the "No opinion" group, and comparisons are based only on those with definite opinions.
The differences reported, which are in all likelihood not due to chance, suggest the phenomenon of "selective exposure" to information. In both cases, every respondent was aware of the contents of the statement or report when he answered the question on policy. Yet in each case, those with prior knowledge of the information had significandy different attitudes. It would appear, therefore, that persons reached by the Palestine report were those who were more likely in the first place to favor United States assistance there, rather than that they favored U.S. assistance because they were familiar with the information contained in the report. Similarly, it would seem that the group which had prior knowledge of the statement on Spain was already more anti-Franco in their attitudes, rather than that they became more anti-Franco by virtue of exposure.
The fact that people tend to become exposed to information which is congenial with their prior attitudes is another factor which must be considered In September I946, a national sample was asked whether they thought that the newspapers they read made Russia out to look better than she really is, worse than she really is, or whether they presented accurate information about Russia [Io] . The same survey also asked a question to determine where the respondent put the blame for
When the sample was classified into two groups-those who blamed Russia entirely and those who put the responsibility on both countries or on the United States alone-there were revealed striking differences in beliefs as to whether Russia was being presented fairly or unfairly in the newspapers they read (see Table 8 ). It is clear from this finding that people selectively discount the information they are exposed to, in the light of their prior attitudes. The finding is all the more striking when one considers the fact that people tend to read the particular newspapers which are congenial to their own attitudes and beliefs. Thus, one would expect the anti-Russian group to be read- The principle -behind all information campaigns is that the disseminated information will alter attitudes or conduct. There is abundant evidence in all fields, of course, that informed people actually do react differently to a problem than uninformed people do. But it is naive to suppose that information always affects attitudes, or that it affects all attitudes equally. The general principle needs serious qualification.
There is evidence, based on investigations made with academic samples, that individuals, once they are exposed to information, change their views differentially, each in the light of his own prior attitude. Data gathered by NORC in recent national surveys show that these academic findings are equally applicable to the entire adult population.
In a continuing study of attitudes to-ward the proposed British loan, conducted between December I945 and February I946, it was found that a significant factor influencing attitudes toward the loan was the belief that this country would or would not get something out of it economically [i2]. As shown by Table 9 , those who were of the opinion that the loan held advantages to this country were strongly in favor, while those of a contrary opinion, or doubtful, were overwhelmingly opposed to the loan. We will get advantages from the loan 66% N=265
Don't know if advantages 29 N29I
We will not get advantages 20 N=294
Furthermore, 39 per cent of those who expressed approval of the loan mentioned some economic advantage as their reason, while 75 per cent of those opposed listed an economic argument. Under these circumstances, it was logical to suppose that attitudes could be changed toward approval of the loan, by informing the public of its economic advantages to the United States. It was not possible to conduct a before-and-after test of this thesis, but some interesting findings were revealed by a study of two equivalent samples which were polled simultaneously.
One of these samples was given the appropriate information before being questioned on their attitude. They were told that England had agreed to pay the money back with interest over a period For example, there was no difference between the two samples in the proportion of "Disapprovers" who gave an economic argument for their disapproval. Fifty-one per cent of those in the control group who were opposed gave as their reason that "England won't pay us back," and 50 per cent of those in the experimental group who were opposed offered the same argument-in spite of the fact that they had been specifically informed of England's agreement to return the money with interest. It was apparent that a large group of those opposed to the loan were rooted to their belief that the money would not be repaid, and the mere information that England had agreed to repay the loan was of no effect in changing their attitudes. Among those who were already favorably disposed toward England, the information given to the experimental group was sufficient to sway a large proportion toward approval of the loan [ I4] . Less than half of this group friendly to England favored the loan in the control sample, but in the experimental sample, which was given the information, the proportion rises to 70 per cent. But among those with hostile or suspicious attitudes toward England, the information had no effect whatever.
This group was overwhelmingly opposed to the loan without the information, and they remained overwhelmingly opposed to it even when they were exposed to the information.
Conclusions
The above findings indicate clearly that those responsible for information campaigns cannot rely simply on "increasing the flow" to spread their information effectively. The psychological barriers we have pointed out create real problems for those charged with the task of informing the public, and in many cases public opinion surveys offer the only means by which these problems can be recognized, and thereby overcome.
Surveys are already widely used to provide the information director with 
